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CURRENT LEGISLATION
NEW YORK LABOR DISPENSATION ACT.-The prosecution of the
present war has given rise to the problem of meeting the need for
increased production with an ever decreasing supply of labor. This
difficulty did not appear to such an extent during the last World
War; there was less of a drain on man-power; there was no "lend-
lease" act; and legislation affecting labor had not reached its present
level. In order to prevent peace time restrictions from interfering
with the war effort, the Labor Dispensation Act, now part of the
New York State War Emergency Act, was enacted. This Act pro-
vides, that upon proper application and investigation, the Industrial
Commissioner may grant certain dispensations to firms engaged in
war work. These dispensations may be granted to permit operation
on seven days of the week for twenty-four hours a day, to permit
dispensation with Section 201-a of the New York State Labor Law 2
and to permit employers engaged in war work to operate "under
waiver of such other provisions of law as may restrict operation or
hours of employment." 3 The Act further provides for appeals from
the Commissioner's rulings,4 and sets up a legislative standard to be
followed in granting relief. No dispensation may be granted affect-
ing minors under sixteen years of age; 5 no dispensation may be
allowed where the safety or health of the employees would be subject
to peril; 6 all dispensations must be shown to be absolutely necessary
to the war effort.7 If a firm applying for relief under this Act has
workers engaged in performing non-essential work, such workers
must be transferred to a department doing war work before the appli-
cation will be considered.8
The powers of the Commissioner under the Act are not well de-
fined, and appear to be all-inclusive. Certain powers are expressly
delegated. By the powers granted under subdivisions (a), (b), and
part of (d) in Section 80 of the Act, the Commissioner may extend
the hours constituting a work week and may permit women to be
employed on night shifts.9 The Commissioner is also given the
I Originally N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 4. Repealed by and added to N. Y. Laws
1942, c. 544; amended N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 618; amended N. Y. Laws 1943,
c. 315 (April 6, 1943).2 "Except as otherwise provided by law, no person, as a condition of secur-
ing employment, or of continuing employment, shall be required to be finger-
printed."
3 N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 544, § 80(d).
4 Id. c. 618.
5 N. Y. Laws 1943, c. 315 (April 6, 1943).
6 N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 544, § 81(c).7 Id. c. 544, § 81(c), (d), (f).8 Id. c. 544, § 81 (e).
9 Dispensation may be granted to permit operation and employment on a
seven-day basis, on a multiple shift basis and to prevent restriction of operation
due to hours of employment.
With the small number of men available it has become necessary for the
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power to allow employers engaged in war work to require their em-
ployees, or prospective employees, to be fingerprinted as a condition
of employment or continued employment. 10 These facts are readily
apparent. But there are also certain "latent" powers in the Act.
The Commissioner is empowered to waive such "other provisions of
law" as might interfere with a business engaged in war work. Acting
under the authority granted by these words the Commissioner might
well dispense with the minimum wage," with regulations providing
for comfort of the employers 12 and the provision of the New York
Civil Practice Act requiring a formal complaint and a hearing as a
prerequisite for the issuance of an injunction in any case involving a
labor dispute.' 3
It is not beyond the realm of possibility that a claim might be
made that the operation of the minimum wage in a particular case
will hamper the production of war materiel. An employer might well
contend that due to the shortage of labor it is necessary for his work-
ers to put in many hours of overtime. The extra payment for such
work, together with the high cost of raw materials and tools and other
things essential to the running of the business, will render it imprac-
tical to continue the overtime work, thereby slowing up war produc-
tion. The Commissioner might then dispense with that provision of
law in order to remove the restriction of operation. The Minimum
Wage Law in New York provides for a board of nine-three persons
representing the interests of labor, three representing the interests of
the employer, and three disinterested persons-to conduct hearings
and set up a wage scale based on the facts obtained at the hearing.14
It might be within the scope of the Industrial Commissioner's author-
ity under the Act to dispense with the minimum wage rate insofar as
it pertains to overtime pay. He might also disregard the wage board's
ruling and conduct a new hearing himself, or through a board of his
own choosing. However, the Minimum Wage Law has a provision
allowing the board to reconsider its findings at the end of a period of
six months or more.15 It is, therefore, not likely that the Commis-
sioner will take upon himself the burden of fixing a new wage level.
He will, no doubt, recommend that the board reconsider its findings, or
have the employer seeking relief apply to the wage board for permis-
sion to decrease compensation for overtime work.
That the establishment of a picket line around the premises of a
business will restrict operation is obvious. Indeed, that is the very
purpose of a picket line. Union members and sympathizers, and
others who do not wish to be seen crossing a picket line, will not
Commissioner to allow the employment of women at night REPORT OF WAR
EMERGENCY ComiTTEi, N. Y. STATE DEP'T OF LABOR (1942).
'ON. Y. Laws 1942, c. 544, § 81(c).
22 N. Y. LABOR LAW, art. 19.
22 Id. §§ 150, 202, 241-a, 378, 379.
3 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 876-a.
14 N. Y. LABOR LAW § 556.
15 Id. § 561.
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report to work. A business cannot be operated without workers, and
relief might be asked for on the ground that war production is being
hampered.
Formerly,1 6 in New York State, it was possible to enjoin picket-
ing with an ex parte order based upon affidavits. 17 This procedure is
now forbidden by law.' 8 To properly enjoin picketing today a for-
mal hearing must be held by the court. The delay necessitated by
the drawing up of a complaint and the holding of a hearing will slow
down production for a considerable length of time. The employer
will desire a quicker method of obtaining the injunction. By the
terms of the Labor Dispensation Act, the Commissioner is allowed to
dispense with "such other provisions of law as may restrict opera-
tion." 19 This language might be construed as broad enough to
include adjective law. Upon application, the Commissioner may grant
dispensation, permitting an injunction to be issued on an ex parte
order. It is not necessary for the Commissioner to hear the inter-
ested parties, since he may grant a provisional dispensation before
conducting an investigation. 20 Although this dispensation might later
be revoked, it will have served its purpose. This power is very sig-
nificant in view of the outbreak of "wildcat" strikes.
The foregoing powers are proper objects of legislative control;
neither the United States Constitution nor the New York Constitu-
tion, is violated. By dispensing with any of these provisions of law
there is no deprivation of property without due process of law.2 '
One interpretation of the prohibition against taking property without
due process of law is that due process was meant to protect against
arbitrary actions and refers to the nature of things at the time of the
incorporation of the words into the Constitution.2 2 At the time of
the signing of the United States Constitution there was no regulation
of working hours, working conditions, or wages. At that period-
and for many years later-a work day of eighteen hours was not
uncommon, wages were small, and general conditions were most un-
desirable.23 It would, therefore, appear that a deprivation of prop-
erty might result from a regulation of employer-employee relations,
rather than from a lack of restriction.24 In fact, all laws regulating
16 Before 1935.
17 At one time the great majority of applicants for injunctive relief in
labor disputes were granted injunctions ex parte. Note (1930) 30 COL. L.
REv. 1184, 1187.
18 N. Y. CIv. PRAC. Acr § 876-a; Note (1935) 22 VA. L. REv. 83.
19 N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 544, § 80(d).
20 Id. c. 544, § 82.
21 U. S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1; N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6.
22 Atchison & N. R. R. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37 (1877) ; Nelson Lumber Co. v.
McKinnon, 61 Minn. 219, 63 N. W. 630 (1895). In the latter case it was held
that test as to constitutionality (in regard to due process) is "Was it due
process of law under the Common Law, and did it remain so up to the time of
the adopting of the Constitution?"-
23 5 COMPTON's ENCYCLOPEDIA (1934 ed.) 2.
24 Lochner v. People of the State of New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 L. ed.
[ VOL. 17
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maximum hours must have some provision for relaxation in cases of
emergency 2 5-and certainly a war which involves the very existence
of the nation is an emergency. The emergency provision is necessary
because the interference with the right to contract can only be justi-
fied where the public welfare is at stake. The public comes first; the
health and economic condition of the individual worker is a secondary
matter.2 6  All personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution must
937, 29 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525,
67 L. ed. 785, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).25 In holding a New York law limiting hours of work in bakeries uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court gave as one of its reasons for so holding the fact
that no provision was made for relaxation of the law in case of emergency.
Lochner v. People of the State of New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 L. ed. 937, 29
Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
26 Owen v. Westwood Lumber Co., 22 F. (2d) 992 (D. Ore. 1927), writ
of error dismissed, 278 U. S. 665, 73 L. ed. 571, 49 Sup. Ct 184 (1928). In
State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259, 139 Pac. 731 (1914), the court, in holding an
act limiting hours of work constitutional said, "The right to labor and employ
labor on terms stipulated by the parties is a property right guaranteed by the
United States Constitution . . .. " Any interference with this right can be sus-
tained only on the theory of police power, and "The safety of a country depends
upon the intelligence of its citizens and if our institutions are to be preserved
the state must see to it that the citizen shall have some leisure which he may
employ in fitting himself for those duties which are the highest attributes of
good citizenship. As a voter, a juror, and in this state, a legislator, the best
results can only be obtained by so limiting the hours of toil so that they may
not be unduly prolonged to the extent of causing that mental deterioration that
is sure to accompany undue and long continued physical exertion." Affirmed,
243 U. S. 426, 61 L. ed. 830, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1919). Reasoning similar to that
used by the state court in this case was used by the Supreme Court in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 Sup. Ct 578(1937). Cf. State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) 204 (1937), where it
was held that a law regulating hours of employment was unconstitutional where
"The statute before us bears no evidence of a legislative purpose by it to safe-
guard public health, morals, or safety." State v. Bunting, supra, distinguished.
On the authority of State v. Henry, supra, a law regulating hours was held
void, although there was some showing that the health of the workers was
involved. Barry v. Compton, 37 N. M. S99, 26 P. (2d) 359 (1933). In
Lochner v. New York. 198 U. S. 45, 49 L. ed. 937, 29 Sup. Ct 539 (1905),
the Court held that the edible quality and nourishment of bread would not be
affected by long hours of work on the part of the bakers. The law regulating
hours of work was held unconstitutional.
The importance of public interest in such statutes is well recognized in
New York. Naw Yoax LAmOR LAw § 550, which introduces the minimum wage
law, declares in part, 'In the absence of any effective minimum wage rates for
women and minors, the constant lowering of wages by unscrupulous employers
constitutes a serious form of unfair competition against other employers and
employees, reduces the purchasing power of the employees, and threatens the
stability of industry and in many instances requires such wages to be supple-
mented by public monies for relief or other public assistance." Thus the legis-
lature justifies the act, not on its effect upon the women and minors, but upon
the public as a whole.
In holding a New York act (N. Y. Laws 1892, c. 711) limiting the hours
of labor for persons engaged in transit operations constitutional, the Court of
Appeals said, "In view of the great danger to, and even destruction of life and
property which might result from the attempt of men, who have become en-
feebled from prolonged and exhausting effort to control engines and cars when
1943 ]
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yield, in time of national emergency, to the public good; all personal
rights are held subject to the reserve element of police power that
rests in the State. As time moves on and new problems arise, appli-
cation of police power may be used to meet the new public needs. 27
Regardless of precedent, an exercise of police power by the legis-
lature will be upheld, provided principles of liberty and justice are
not violated.2 8 The powers of the Industrial Commissioner are not
absolute. Proper investigation must be made 2 9 and appeals may be
taken from his rulings to the New York State Board of Standards
and Appeals and to the courts.30 In this manner the principles of
justice are maintained.
The United States Constitution requires that all citizens enjoy
the equal protection of the laws.31 This part of the Constitution is
not violated by the Labor Dispensation Act. The right to equal pro-
tection of the laws forbids unjust discrimination, but where legisla-
tion is aimed at hitting an evil (in this case to prevent possible defeat
due to restrictions on war work) such an act is not to be upset if
there is any justification for the finding of a difference in classifica-
tion.832  If persons in similar circumstances are treated alike, the
amendment is not violated. 33  A substantial distinction exists between
in motion . . . it was a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state."
People v. Phyfe, 186 N. Y. 554, 32 N. E. 978 (1893).
27 People v. Chenango County, - Misc. -, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 785, 791
(Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1943); Kelly-Sullivan, Inc. v. Moss, - Misc. -, 39
N. Y. S. (2d) 797, 800 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co. 1943).
28 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 Sup. Ct. 77(1899); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 81 L. ed. 1307, 37 Sup. Ct 904(1937).29 N . Y. Laws 1942, c. 544, §§ 80, 82.
30 Id. c. 618.
31 U. S. CONST. AmEND. XIV, § 1.
.2 Louisville G. & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 Sup.
Ct. 423 (1928).
33 In People v. Creeden, 281 N. Y. 413, 24 N. E. (2d) 105 (1939), it was
held that the burden of proof was on the person claiming unjust discrimination
to show that the distinction made between classes was arbitrary. In Radice v.
People of the State of New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 Sup. Ct. 325(1924), a statute limiting hours of employment of women in restaurants in
first and second class cities, with the exception of singers and performers,
attendants in ladies' cloak rooms and parlors and those employed in hotel dining
rooms and restaurants conducted by employers solely for the benefit of their
employees, was held not to deny the equal protection of the laws. Every selec-
tion of persons for regulation results in some inequality. To be violative of
the equal protection clause the inequality produced by a statute must lie palpably
and actually unreasonable and arbitrary. In Dominion Hotel v. State of Ari-
zona, 249 U. S. 265, 63 L. ed. 597, 39 Sup. Ct. 273 (1919), Mr. Justice Holmes
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the impossible. "The
equal protection of the laws does not mean that all occupations that are called
by the same name must be treated the same way. The powers of the state
'may be determined by degrees of evil, as exercised in cases where detriment is
especially experienced.' Armour and Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 517.
It may do what it can to prevent what is deemed an evil and stop short of those
cases in which the harm to the few concerned is less than the harm to the
[ VOL. 17
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a business engaged in turning out work merely to make life com-
fortable and one helping to preserve the nation.
Before the passage of the law forbidding such practices, it was
not uncommon for an employer to require his employees to be finger-
printed. Such actions did not violate any constitutional right, since
an employer may impose such conditions of employment as he sees
fit to insure the honesty of those who work for him. However,
because of its effectiveness as a means of identification it was used as
a means of "blacklisting" those who participated in union activities.
It was at this practice that the prohibition was aimed. Where a law
or ordinance permits an employer to require those who would work
for him to be fingerprinted as necessary for the protection of the
public, such a law will be upheld.34  It is important that certain per-
sons be kept from gaining information that would aid the enemy. A
positive system of identification is needed, and this need is supplied by
the examination of fingerprints. A waiver of the fingerprint prohibi-
tion in such a case would be valid.
Before the enactment of Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act,
a court having equity jurisdiction could validly issue an ex parte order
restraining picketing, or other conduct in a labor dispute. This
method of obtaining relief often resulted in irreparable harm, and,
therefore, this practice was stopped.35 Under the state constitution,
New York courts may exercise those functions formerly possessed by
courts of equity.3 6 Since at common law equity could enjoin any
conduct arising out of a labor dispute without holding a hearing,37 it
would not seem to be unconstitutional for the legislature to dispense
with the statute requiring a hearing in such cases.
It has been demonstrated that the legislature could constitution-
ally dispense with provisions of the law affecting labor. The Act
does not, however, provide for dispensation to be granted by a legis-
lative, but by an administrative body. The problem then arises as to
the validity of such a grant of power. In the Act the legislature set
down certain standards, and then said that when these rules are met
by the applicant dispensation may be granted, and not otherwise.
The legislature would have the power to conduct hearings in each
case and by statute grant dispensations to meet each case. Such a
practice would take up so much of the time of the legislature that
essential work would be neglected. It has been held that a legislative
body has, in addition to the power of making laws, the power to see
that these laws are enforced. Where it is necessary to examine
public... The only question is whether we can say in our judicial knowledge
.. that there were ... public considerations for the distinction . . .".
34 Friedman v. Valentine, 177 Misc. 437, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 891 (Sup. Ct.,
N. Y. Co. 1941).
35 N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477, § 1.
36 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 1. "The authority given includes all cases
which may properly be comprehended by established and existing legal prin-
ciples." Youngs v. Carter, 11 Hun 194 (N. Y. 1877).
37 Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 1184.
1943)
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closely the facts of the individual case to determine how to use its
regulatory powers in a given instance, it is proper for the legislature
to set forth a method of procedure and delegate the mechanical work
of applying the facts to the legislative rules.38 It is necessary that
the rules be clear.39 The rules in the Act are set by the legislature,
and the standard to be applied is- made clear; all that remains for the
administrator is to determine what persons are to benefit by the Act.
This is a proper delegation of authority.
40
The definition of "war work", at first vague, 41 is not clearly
defined. It includes in its scope any employer who can satisfy the
38 It was held in People v. Morehead, 156 Misc. 522, 282 N. Y. Supp. 576
(1935), that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to delegate some of its
power to an administrative body, where the act authorizing the delegation does
not leave unlimited discretion in the hands of the agency, but sets up a standard
which must be followed. Reversed on other grounds, 270 N. Y. 233, 200 N. E.
799 (1936); 298 U. S. 587, 80 L. ed. 1347, 56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936). Compare
the latter decision with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U. S. 379, 81
L. ed. 703, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).
In Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873), quoted in Carstens v. DeSelbem,
82 Wash. 643, 144 Pac. 934 (1914), it was said that "The legislature cannot
delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power
to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own action depend." And in Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32,
165 N. W. 495 (1917), "The legislature may, however, delegate to a commission
the power to do some things which it might properly, but cannot advantageously
do itself." The Supreme Court agrees with this rule. Mr. Chief Justice Taft
in Hampton, Jr. Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 72 L. ed. 584, 48 Sup. Ct.
348 (1928), stated that "Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to deter-
mine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective,
because dependent upon future conditions, and it may leave the determination
of such time to the decision of an Executive .... If Congress shall lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body . . . is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power."
39 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230,
59 L. ed. 552, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1915). "Undoubtedly the legislature must
declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control
... an administrative body may be invested with power to ascertain the facts
and conditions to which the policy and principles apply .. ." The statute must
furnish a general standard, and where appeal to the courts is allowed, there is
no danger of arbitrary action.
40 Many cases have come before the Supreme Court and the state courts in
which it was held that administrative bodies may grant dispensation from
prohibitions set by law, provided there was a general legislative standard.
Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 58 L. ed. 1048, 34 Sup. Ct. 986
(1914) ; People v. Klnick Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278 (1915);
Doscher v. Sisson, 222 N. Y. 387, 118 N. E. 789 (1918).
41 At first, "war work" was defined as "work in producing articles or
materials on or for contracts for the United States army or navy, or for any
other agency of the United States, or work in performing other services related
thereto and necessary for the successful waging of the present war." N. Y.
Laws 1942, c. 544, § 79. This was added to, enlarging the scope of the defi-
nition, by N. Y. Laws 1943, c. 315 (April 6, 1943), and now reads-in addition
-work in producing materials for "noncombatant service performed in connec-
tion with any other occupation, activity, or employment essential to the effective
prosecution of the war or necessary to protect the-public health and welfare."
[ VOL. 17
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Commissioner that he is, however indirectly, helping to win the war.
A business that would raise morale of war workers, or aid them to be
better fit to work by improving their health, would come within the
Act. This classification, while very clear, is far too broad. The
legislature would do well to consider the requirement for the granting
of dispensation from provisions of law restricting operation set forth
by the state of California. In that state an employer wishing to
obtain relief must produce a statement from Army or Navy officials
to the effect that the employer is engaged in essential war work and
that a relaxation of the rules is necessary to maintain production.42
Under the sweeping definition of war work in the New York act it is
indeed difficult to say that any employer is not engaged in war work.
For the public good it should be necessary for the employer to show
that his work is absolutely essential in the war effort. It seems that
the original purpose of the Act is being lost sight of, and the present




42 Regulations of the California Industrial Commission as quoted in C. C.
H. Labor Law Service, vol. 2A, paragraph 45,000, State of California.
43 Two amendments to the Act have come to the attention of the author
after the Law Review went to the press. New York Laws 1943, c. 171, § 7
changes the provisions for appeals. Appeal may be taken from the ruling of
the Industrial Commissioner to the Board of Standards and Appeals. The
Board's rulings on questions of fact are conclusive; appeal to the appellate
divisions on questions of law is permitted. The appellant has twenty days from
the time of the Board's decision in which to file notice of appeal with the clerk
of the court New York Laws 1942, c. 618 is repealed by New York Laws
1943, c. 171, § 16.
New York Laws 1943, c. 171, § 5 amends the Labor Dispensation Act to
allow certain dispensations in relation to public works. This amendment seems
to bear out our contention that the Commissioner might dispense with minimum
wage provisions of the Labor Law. "Conditions . . . with respect.. . wages
may be imposed in connection with such dispensations!' This amendment is
made § 81 of the Labor Dispensation Act Former § 81 et seq. are renumbered
accordingly by New York Laws 1943, c. 171, § 6.
1943 ]
